The Canadian Aviation Safety Board determined that an uncontained failure of the left engine thirteenth stage compressor disc had occurred. Debris from the engine punctured a fuel cell, resulting in the fire. The disc failure was the result of fatigue cracking.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was that the pilot landed the aeroplane without sufficient information as to runway condition on a slippery, ice-covered runway, the condition of which exceeded the aeroplane's stopping capability. The lack of adequate information with respect to the runway was due to the fact that 1) the FAA regulations did not provide guidance to airport management regarding the measurement of runway slipperiness under adverse conditions; 2) the FAA regulations did not provide the flight crew and other personnel with the means to correlate contaminated surfaces with aeroplane stopping distances; 3) the FAA regulations did not extend authorised minimum runway lengths to reflect reduced braking effectiveness on icy runways; 4) the Boston-Logan International Airport management railed to exercise maximum efforts to assess and improve the conditions of the ice-covered runways to assure continued safety of heavy jet aeroplane operations; and, 5) tower controllers failed to transmit available braking information to the pilot of Flight 30H.
Contributing to the accident was the failure of pilot reports on braking to convey the severity of the hazard to following pilots.
The pilot's decision to retain autothrottle speed control throughout the flare and the consequent extended touchdown point on the runway contributed to the severity of the accident.
About 2120 local time, National Airlines Flight 193 crashed into Escambia Bay while executing a surveillance radar approach to runway 25 at Pensacola Regional Airport. The aircraft crashed about 3 nmi from the east end of runway 25 and came to rest in about 12 ft of water. There were 52 passengers and a crew of 6 on board; 3 passengers were drowned.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was the flightcrew's unprofessionally conducted nonprecision approach, in that the captain and the crew failed to monitor the descent rate and altitude, and the first officer failed to provide the captain with the required altitude and approach performance callouts. The crew failed to check and utilise all instruments available for altitude awareness, turned off the ground proximity warning system, and failed to configure the aircraft properly and in a timely manner for the approach.
Contributing to the accident was the radar controller's failure to provide advance notice of the start-descent point which accelerated the pace of the crew's cockpit activities after the passage of the final approach fix.
On February 28, 1984, an SAS DC10 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Stockholm, Sweden to New York City. Following an approach to runway 4 right at JFK Airport, the aeroplane touched down about 4,700 ft beyond the threshold of the 8,400 ft runway and could not be stopped on the runway. The aeroplane was steered to the right to avoid the approach light pier at the departure end of the runway and came to rest in Thurston Basin, a tidal waterway located about 600 ft from the departure end of the runway 4 right. The 163 passengers and 14 crew members evacuated the aeroplane safely, but a few received minor injuries. The nose and lower forward fuselage sections, wing engines, flaps and leading edge devices were substantially damaged at impact.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probably cause of the accident was the flightcrew's a) disregard for the prescribed procedures for monitoring and controlling of airspeed during the final stages of the approach, b) decision to continue the landing rather than to execute a missed approach, and c) overreliance on the autothrottle speed control system which had a history of recent malfunctions.
89 Passengers & 6 crew
At 24,000ft, the aircraft experienced a rapid decompression when an 18 ft section of the fuselage (roof and sides) ripped out. The aircraft declared an emergency and 13 minutes later, landed at Maui. The noise was so great in the cockpit that the flight crew were only able to communicate using hand-signals.
An evacuation was initiated. One stewardess was lost though the break in the fuselage and several passengers sustained injuries. The cause of the accident was put down to metal fatigue.
The aircraft took off from Honolulu at about 0155 with 3 flight crew, 15 cabin crew and 337 passengers. Approx. 20 minutes into the flight, a rapid decompression occurred at about 23,000 ft, when the forward starboard cargo door and 15`X10` section of the cabin fuselage separated. Nine passengers were lost. The aeroplane returned to Honolulu and landed safely at 0234. An emergency evacuation was conducted using all main deck slides.
The aircraft encountered heavy precipitation, including hail up to 1.25in. in diameter, while on approach to New Orleans International Airport.
Power in both engines was interrupted at 16,200ft. The Flight Crew were able to establish emergency electrical power and start the aircraft's auxiliary power unit at an altitude of 10,500ft. A total of four engine restarts were then attempted, two for each engine, without success.
Initially, the captain was planning to ditch the aircraft in the Intracoastal Waterway, but at the last minute he sighted a 6,060 X 120ft grass strip. The flight crew successfully made an unpowered landing and all passengers and crew evacuated the aircraft using the slides.
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